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**Case Project 02**

**CY5210 Information System Forensics**

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# Table of Contents

[Table of Contents 2](#_Toc116816171)

[EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3](#_Toc116816172)

[INTRODUCTION 4](#_Toc116816173)

[ANALYSIS 5](#_Toc116816174)

[WINDOWS REGISTRY 5](#_Toc116816175)

[SYSTEM INFORMATION 5](#_Toc116816176)

[USER ACTIVITY 6](#_Toc116816177)

[USB DEVICE ACTIVITY 7](#_Toc116816178)

[APPLICATIONS AND MALWARE 8](#_Toc116816179)

[PREFETCH 8](#_Toc116816180)

[SHELL ITEMS 9](#_Toc116816181)

[CONCLUSION 11](#_Toc116816182)

[APPENDIX 12](#_Toc116816183)

[APPENDIX I: Forensic Tools 12](#_Toc116816184)

[APPENDIX II: Registry Paths 12](#_Toc116816185)

[APPENDIX III: Artifacts List 13](#_Toc116816186)

[APPENDIX IV: Prefetch Analysis 14](#_Toc116816187)

[APPENDIX V: Shellbag Analysis 14](#_Toc116816188)

[APPENDIX VI: Link Analysis 16](#_Toc116816189)

[APPENDIX VII: Jump List Analysis 16](#_Toc116816190)

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 21st, 2019, the company “The Shield SOC” was notified of the unusual activity of downloading multiple Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs) onto one of their systems. The Incident Response Team collected and provided the system in question to the Forensics Teams to perform an investigation. After budgeting constraints and the COVID, pandemic delayed the investigation, the Case Study for this report was finalized on October 16th, 2022.

The Forensics Team appointed Jon Metzger as the Forensic Analyst and Investigator for the case. His investigation found that a company employee named Steven Rogers copied confidential documents from their company-owned system onto a USB external media and a cloud storage Dropbox. S. Rogers knew where sensitive information was located on the file system. The user was able to use their administrative privileges to download malicious applications onto the system illegally. These applications enabled him to move confidential documents from the company’s hard drive system to his external media. From there, he attempted to cover his tracks from security and log out before the workday started. The analysis section will detail the user’s actions to violate the organization's enforced Acceptable Use Policy (AUP).

# INTRODUCTION

There was an alert that was received by Shield SOC that an illegal download for BitTorrent and Privacy Cleaner utilities. These applications are of concern because they can be used with confidential data to expose sensitive data outside the company. Both applications violated the company’s Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) and can be Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs). The incident response team member Bucky Barnes identified the violation on Monday, January 21st, 2019, at 3:17:18 PM EST. The Forensics Team was requested to perform an analysis on the system that notified the alert for a Case Study.

The image and devices were acquired and imaged by the Forensics Team on Monday, September 19th, 2022. The Chain of Custody document required for the Case Study was completed on Sunday, October 16th, 2022, EST, and is delivered with this report. Figure 1 below verified the hash of the system. It is calculated in both MD5 and SHA1 hash values. The verification checked that the hash computed and reported a match. This is essential because the tool checks to see if the image's content was modified, with its integrity intact, between computing and reporting on the case.

Once the Forensics Team started their analysis, they had the authority to use the tools FTK Imager Lite, Arsenal Image Mounter, Registry Ripper, AccessData Registry Viewer, LECmd (LNK file parser), JLECmd (Jump List parser), Shellbags Explorer, PECmd (Prefetch file parser) and USB Detective. These tools and their commands are found in APPENDIX I. The team was also provided a Windows 11 machine to run these tools with administrator privileges.




Figure Verification of the system investigated named “CS1\_001”

# ANALYSIS

The analysis will cover Windows Registry, System Information, User activity, USB Device activity, Application and Malware use, Prefetch, Shellbags, Linkfiles, and JumpLists. By the forensics team obtaining this information from the incident response team, we will be able to justify if the user S. Rogers violated company policy.

## WINDOWS REGISTRY

The Windows Registry identifies current system configurations and settings used during the investigation. They can show the current state of the system and actions performed by all users on the system. The following Hives were analyzed for the analysis using the tool Access Data FTK Imager, which can be found in APPENDIX III:

* **NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SAM**
* **NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM**
* **NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE**
* **NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/NTUSER.DAT**

The SAM Registry Hive focused on profiling users and groups. The SYSTEM Registry Hive identified system information and configuration settings. The SOFTWARE Registry Hive revealed applications downloaded, installed, executed, and uninstalled onto the system. The NTUSER.DAT Registry Hive focused on specific user activity.

## SYSTEM INFORMATION

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Key | Value |
| Microsoft OS Version | Windows 10 Pro (10.0.16299.15) |
| Build Version | 16299 |
| Current Control Set | 001 |
| Computer Name | AVENGERS01 |
| Time Zone | Eastern Standard Time |
| OS Install Date | 2019-01-19 03:06:56Z |
| Network Interfaces | 10.0.0.81, hsd1.ma.comcast.net, configured for DHCP |
| AutoStart Programs | LastWrite Time 2019-01-20 21:12:14Z - SecurityHealth - %ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\MSASCuiL.exe - VMware User Process - "C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe" -n vmusr |
| LastWrite Time 2019-01-20 21:17:39Z - Dropbox - "C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\Dropbox.exe" /systemstartup |
| LastWrite Time 2019-01-20 21:17:37Z  - GrpConv - grpconv -o |
| Last Shutdown Time | 2019-01-20 21:11:38Z |

Table System Information

Our goal was to collect the system’s configurations, settings, user data, and activity to scope a full picture of the activity that went on around the time of the alert. The hostname “AVENGERS01” was analyzed by the Forensics team to inspect the malicious activity that was reported. On the Windows 10 Pro system, we found that the operating installation time was 2019-01-19 at 03:06:56Z and set in Eastern Standard time. We used Registry Ripper to analyze the hives of SAM, SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, and User (NTUSER.DAT and USRCLASS.DAT). The system’s network configurations are set to IP Address 10.0.0.81 and configured for DHCP. The system's last shutdown occurred before the incident, meaning the system has been running since the incident occurred.

Interestingly, the application “Dropbox” is one of the system’s AutoStart Programs. This application is on the company-restricted list and should not have been installed onto the system. This finding will need to be further investigated when analyzing the user activity around the time of the incident.

## USER ACTIVITY

Users for this system have the Domain UID of **S-1-5-21-263698462-3103634936-1936700066**. With “S” indicating the type is a SID, “1” as the revision level, “5” as the authority value, “21” meaning that it is a domain ID, and 263698462-3103634936-1936700066 as the “unique identifier.” Next are each username “RID” of the system specified below in Table 2. Together make the “Security IDentified” or SID. Using the template:

*“<id\_type>-<revision\_level>-<authority\_value>-<specification\_id>-<unique\_identifier>-<RID>”*

The srogers’ SID is **S-1-5-21-263698462-3103634936-1936700066-1001**.

As shown in the table below, no user was under the group Remote Desktop Users, so no user was able to ssh into the system. However, both the Administrator and srogers users are under the Group Administrator. This indicates that the srogers user had administrator privileges and caused harm to the system and company. All but the Administrator account has their password not required and not expired. This analysis states that the srogers account was not adequately secured and given full privileges. It was also the only account on the system that was enabled with the last login time of 2019-01-21 at 18:56:51Z.

User account srogers is a focus of this analysis since that account is given administrative privileges, ten logins, a password reset time of 2019-01-19 at 03:11:57Z, password not required and does not expire, and the last login is around the time of the security alert.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Username | RID | Status | Last Login | Password Reset | Group | Password |
| srogers | 1001 | Enabled, 10 logins | 2019-01-21 18:56:51Z | 2019-01-19 03:11:57Z | Administrator | Not Required/Not Expired |
| Administrator | 500 | Disabled | Never | Never | Administrator | Not Expire |
| Guest | 501 | Disabled | Never | Never | Guest | Not Required/Not Expired |
| DefaultAccount | 503 | Disabled | Never | Never | System Managed Accounts Group | Not Required/Not Expired |
| WDAGUtilityAccount | 504 | Disabled | Never | 2019-01-19 06:04:22Z | n/a | n/a |

Table User Information

The forensics team went through the user activity of the user srogers. They reviewed the user’s Windows Search History, Typed Paths, RecentDocs, Last Executed Commands, and UserAssist findings. These registry locations can be found in APPENDIX II.

After the investigation, the team identified that the user srogers did not search for specific files or applications of interest. The user did not search for paths on the systems related to the investigation. However, RecentDocs revealed that the user accessed various sensitive files at the time of the alert. These documents are addressed in the LinkedFiles and JumpList portion of the analysis.

## USB DEVICE ACTIVITY

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Device Name | Serial Number | User Account | First Time | Last Time |
| Kingston Data Traveler 2.0 | 200706200000000059187F6F | sroger | 2019-01-21 05:00:14Z | 2019-01-21 18:41:06Z |

Table USB Device Connected to “AVENGERS01”

We found that a 60 GB-sized USB labeled “Kingston Data Traveler 2.0” was connected to the system at the time of the alert. The user srogers were accessing the USB through the E: drive. The table above reveals that the first and last time of the device's first and last time was between 5:00 AM and 6:45 PM, more than 13 hours. Later, it was revealed that the USB connected and used by user “srogers” was labeled “Shield\_USB,” with multiple confidential and sensitive documents copied onto this volume. This information is covered in the Chain of Custody form attached to the report.

## APPLICATIONS AND MALWARE

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Path | Filename | LastUsed | Download | Installed | Executed | Uninstalled |
| N/A | Microsoft OneDrive v.18.240.1202.0004 | 2019-01-20 02:46:39Z |  |  |  | X |
| 2019-01-20 21:10:08Z  {1AC14E77-02E7-4E5D-B744-2EB1AE5198B7} | cmd.exe | 2019-01-20 21:10:08Z |  |  | X |  |
| C:\Users\srogers\Downloads | DropboxInstaller.exe | 2019-01-20 21:13:26Z | X | X | X |  |
| C:\Users\srogers\Downloads | BitTorrent.exe | 2019-01-20 21:26:03Z | X | X | X | X |
| C:\Users\srogers\Downloads | torbrowser-install-win64-8.0.4\_en-US.exe | 2019-01-21 05:10:14Z | X | X | X |  |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup | privacy-eraser-setup.exe | 2019-01-21 16:57:41Z |  |  | X |  |

Table Applications by LastUsed

The applications, including possible malware highlighted in RED, used by the user “srogers” are shown in the table above, sorted by LastUsed. The user executed the command line prompt and privacy eraser. The user downloaded and installed multiple applications, including DropboxInstaller (highlighted in BLUE), BitTorrent, and Torbrowser Installer. Lastly, the user uninstalled the BitTorrent application to attempt to hide their tracks. In addition, the user moved DropboxInstaller and ChromeSetup to the RecycleBin.

These items were recovered and analyzed. Microsoft OneDrive was not used during these events but was uninstalled. This action raises questions on the purpose of uninstalling the application after the chain of events of downloading, installing, and executing these applications.

## PREFETCH

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Executable  Name | Source  Created | Source  Modified | Size | Run  Count | LastRun | FirstRun | Volume0  Serial |
| FTK IMAGER.EXE | 2019-01-21 19:50:48 | 2019-01-21 19:50:48 | 112198 | 1 | 2019-01-21 19:50:38 | N/A | CEFB0E37 |
| TOR.EXE | 2019-01-21 05:10:59 | 2019-01-21 05:10:59 | 45416 | 1 | 2019-01-21 05:10:49 | N/A | EA174897 |
| BITTORRENT.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:27:28 | 2019-01-20 21:27:28 | 108952 | 1 | 2019-01-20 21:27:18 | N/A | EA174897 |
| DROPBOX.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:18:01 | 2019-01-20 21:18:07 | 155234 | 4 | 2019-01-20 21:17:55 | 2019-01-20 21:17:55 | EA174897 |
| DROPBOXINSTALLER.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:13:36 | 2019-01-20 21:13:36 | 39974 | 1 | 2019-01-20 21:13:26 | N/A | EA174897 |

Table Prefix Analysis for "AVENGERS01"

The Prefetch data that were found included executables run by the srogers user. More of the findings can be found in APPENDIX IV. This information overlaps with the previous section but goes into more detail about each application. The malicious applications are again highlighted in RED, and applications of interest that export information to the cloud is highlighted in BLUE. It includes the source created and modified.

It is verified that these applications were not modified since their installation and that their integrity was intact. These applications were only used once, with Dropbox running four times, but their timestamps match. With the inclusion of FTK Imager and the exclusion of Privacy Erased, it seemed that the tool was used at the time of the event.

## SHELL ITEMS

The following documents from the below table show that the “Shield Documents” directory was taken from the hard drive and copied onto the E: drive where the external “Shield\_USB” was located. More information on the ShellBags collected can be found in APPENDIX V. Also, it seemed that the user later copied the shielddocuments onto the desktop. These file names indicate that the user was handling sensitive information about the organization, especially outside regular work hours.

The Link File Analysis shows which files were connected between drives. The two types shown in the table above are Removable Storage Media (USB) and Fixed Storage Media (Hard Drive). More information on the linked files obtained in this investigation can be found in APPENDIX VI. The user srogers linked two documents titled “Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts.xlsx” and “Alloys.pptx” from the Hard Drive to the USB Drive named “Shield\_USB.” It was interesting to see that the Alloys.pptx file had a file size great than that on the hard drive.

We tracked the system’s JumpList, which followed that sensitive documents were copied from the hard drive named “AVENGERS01” to the removable storage media “Shield\_USB” These documents contain “Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts” and “Allows.” Additionally, a copy labeled “Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx” More information on jump lists can be found in APPENDIX VII.

With these findings, the Forensics Team could track which files were copied from the hard drive onto the external media and the Dropbox directory to export into the cloud. The following table explains the evidence required to be presented to the legal team against S. Rogers.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| File  Path | Src/Dst  Created | Src/Dst  Modified | Source Accessed | File Size | Shell/Drive Type | Volume Serial/Label | MachineID |
| Desktop\E:\\Shield Documents | 1/21/19 04:59 | 1/21/19 04:57 | n/a | n/a | Directory | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\MyComputer\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents | 1/21/19 05:06:00 | 1/21/19 05:06:00 | n/a | n/a | Directory | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\Shared Documents Folder (Users Files)\Dropbox\Shield Documents | 1/21/19 05:06:00 | 1/21/19 05:07:00 | n/a | n/a | Directory | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\My Computer\Downloads\shielddocuments | 1/21/19 16:57:00 | 1/21/19 16:57:00 | n/a | n/a | Directory | n/a | n/a |
| E:\Shield Documents\Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts.xlsx | 2019-01-21 05:05:04 | 2019-01-21 05:06:18 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 10147 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Alloys.ppt | 2019-01-21 05:00:45 | 2019-01-21 05:04:07 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 946688 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents\Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:07:00 | 2019-01-21 05:07:00 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 31590 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents | 2019-01-21 05:05:04 | 2019-01-21 05:07:00 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Personal\Random Accounting Spreadsheet.xlsx | 2019-01-21 19:16:10 | 2019-01-21 19:16:10 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 10144 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Desktop\Alloys.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:04:43 | 2019-01-21 05:04:43 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 697230 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents\Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 03:48:38 | n/a | 31590 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Dropbox\Shield Documents\Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 03:48:38 | n/a | 31590 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Desktop\Alloys.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:04:38 | 2019-01-21 05:04:42 | n/a | 697230 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| E:\Alloys.ppt | 2019-01-21 04:59:57 | 2019-01-21 04:56:56 | n/a | 946688 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents | 2019-01-21 05:21:26 | 2019-01-21 05:21:26 | n/a | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| E:\Shield Documents\Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts.xlsx | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 04:11:14 | n/a | 10147 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |

Table Shellbags, Linked Files, JumpList

## 

# CONCLUSION

To conclude, after observing the evidence on the hard drive labeled “avengers01” on Monday, January 21st, 2019, at 3:17:18 PM EST, an alert of applications that violate the company’s Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) and possibly be Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs) were installed onto the system.

After thoroughly investigating the system, the Forensics Team found instances where the user labeled “srogers” connected an external media device labeled “Shield\_USB” on the approach to extract sensitive documents. S. Rogers installed Dropbox, BitTorrent, and TORBROWSER to bypass any company safeguards to extract data. They copied papers under the “Shield Documents” directory from the hard drive to the external media, violating company policy. Installing those applications also violated company policy since those programs were installed outside of the company-approved method. Utilizing these documents was during off hours around 5 AM that morning.

The user tried to cover their tracks by uninstalling the Dropbox application and moving the installer to the Recycling Bin. These actions were recovered by forensics and tied back to the original user. This user had Administrator privileges and could have harmed the system and organization. Luckily, no harm was done, and the user tried to use stealth techniques to infiltrate the organization’s strategy, extract sensitive documents, and hide their tracks.

Recommendations following the investigation are as follows. Legal actions should be taken by the organization that owns the sensitive documents against the individual. The organization’s IT department will need to restrict USB access to their system for this does not occur again. They additionally will need to lock down elevated privileges, require administrative rights to download applications not already authorized by the ISSO, and secure these sensitive and confidential documents in a secure location and not on the user's Documents and Desktop directories. Overall, it is a good idea to notify the organization of this breach, to provide reminders on the consequences, and require additional security/human error training. This event may have occurred in a public setting with other employees on the premises. They should be reminded to report any unusual behavior to security.

# APPENDIX

## APPENDIX I: Forensic Tools

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Tool | Version | Command |
| Access Data Forensic Toolkit (FTK) | v6.4 | GUI |
| Access Data FTK Imager | v3.4.2.6 | GUI |
| Registry Ripper | v3.0 | GUI |
| Autopsy | v4.6.0 | GUI |
| USBDeviceForensics | v1.5.2 | GUI |
| AccessData Registry Viewer | v2.0 | GUI |
| ShellBags Explorer\* | V1.0 | GUI |
| DCode Date | V4.02 | GUI |
| Prefetch\* | v1.5 | PECmd –d “Directory for Prefetch Files” --csv “Directory Output\pf.csv” |
| Link File\* | v1.5 | LECmd –d “Directory for Link Files” --csv “Directory Output\lnk.csv” |
| Jump List\* | v1.5 | JLECmd –d “Directory for Jump Files” --csv “Directory Output\jmp.csv” |
| Shellbags Cmd | v2.0 | SBECmd –d “Directory for ShellBag Items” --csv “Directory Output\sb.csv” |

\*Eric Zimmerman’s Tools (Source: https://ericzimmerman.github.io/#!index.md)

## APPENDIX II: Registry Paths

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Hive | Directory | Name | Description |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer | TypedPaths | Paths Typed by User |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer | WordWheelQuery | Windows Search History |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer | RecentDocs | Recent Documents |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer | UserAssist | User Program execution |
| NTUSER.DAT | \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ | <Policies>\RunMRU | User Command execution |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion | Run | Applications Ran |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion | RunOnce | Applications Ran Once |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell | Bags (Desktop) | ShellBags |
| NTUSER.DAT | Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell | BagMRU (Desktop) | ShellBags List |
| NTUSER.DAT | System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters | Interfaces | Network Interfaces |
| USRCLASS.DAT | Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell | Bags (Explorer) | ShellBags |
| USRCLASS.DAT | Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell | BagMRU (Explorer) | ShellBags List |

## APPENDIX III: Artifacts List

1. NTFS Files
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/$MFT
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/$LogFile
2. Registry Hives
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SECURITY
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SAM
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]//Users/srogers/NTUSER.DAT
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]//Users/srogers/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/UsrClass.dat
3. Logs
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs
4. Additional Shellbag Folders
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/Prefetch
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/AppData
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Recent
5. User’s Profile Folders
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/Desktop
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/Documents
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/Downloads
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Users/srogers/Dropbox
6. Additional Artifacts
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/$Recycle.Bin (folder)
   * NONAME [NTFS]/[root]/Windows/INF/setupapi.dev.log

## APPENDIX IV: Prefetch Analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Executable Name | Source Created | Source Modified | File Size | Run Count | LastRun | FirstRun | Volume  Serial |
| SEARCHFILTERHOST.EXE | 2019-01-19 03:15:18 | 2019-01-21 19:51:29 | 16574 | 59 | 2019-01-21 19:51:19 | 2019-01-21 18:57:21 | EA174897 |
| FTK IMAGER.EXE | 2019-01-21 19:50:48 | 2019-01-21 19:50:48 | 112198 | 1 | 2019-01-21 19:50:38 |  | CEFB0E37 |
| CONHOST.EXE | 2019-01-19 03:22:06 | 2019-01-21 19:49:57 | 28406 | 42 | 2019-01-21 19:49:47 | 2019-01-21 17:56:08 | CEFB0E37 |
| EDD.EXE | 2019-01-21 19:49:57 | 2019-01-21 19:49:57 | 29050 | 1 | 2019-01-21 19:49:47 |  | CEFB0E37 |
| CONSENT.EXE | 2019-01-19 03:21:45 | 2019-01-21 19:49:47 | 130694 | 10 | 2019-01-21 19:49:46 | 2019-01-20 02:44:09 | CEFB0E37 |
| TOR.EXE | 2019-01-21 05:10:59 | 2019-01-21 05:10:59 | 45416 | 1 | 2019-01-21 05:10:49 |  | EA174897 |
| BITTORRENT.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:27:28 | 2019-01-20 21:27:28 | 108952 | 1 | 2019-01-20 21:27:18 |  | EA174897 |
| BITTORRENT.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:26:13 | 2019-01-20 21:26:13 | 48388 | 1 | 2019-01-20 21:26:03 |  | EA174897 |
| DROPBOX.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:18:01 | 2019-01-20 21:18:07 | 155234 | 4 | 2019-01-20 21:17:55 | 2019-01-20 21:17:55 | EA174897 |
| DROPBOX.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:17:24 | 2019-01-20 21:17:24 | 151882 | 1 | 2019-01-20 21:17:18 |  | EA174897 |
| DROPBOXINSTALLER.EXE | 2019-01-20 21:13:36 | 2019-01-20 21:13:36 | 39974 | 1 | 2019-01-20 21:13:26 |  | EA174897 |

## APPENDIX V: Shellbag Analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Absolute  Path | Shell  Type | Value | Created  On | Modified  On |
| Desktop\My Computer | Root folder: GUID | My Computer | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\Home Folder | Root folder: GUID | Home Folder | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\C:\ | Users property view: Drive letter | C:\ | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\D:\ | Users property view: Drive letter | D:\ | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\E:\ | Users property view: Drive letter | E:\ | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\Shared Documents Folder (Users Files) | Root folder: GUID | Shared Documents Folder (Users Files) | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\Search Folder | Users property view | Search Folder | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\Search Folder | Users property view | Search Folder | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\My Computer\Downloads | Root folder: GUID | Downloads | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\My Computer\Documents | Root folder: GUID | Documents | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\My Computer\Desktop | Root folder: GUID | Desktop | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\My Computer\Pictures | Root folder: GUID | Pictures | n/a | n/a |
| Desktop\My Computer\Downloads\shielddocuments | Directory | shielddocuments | 1/21/19 16:57 | 1/21/19 16:57 |
| Desktop\My Computer\Documents\USB Backup | Directory | USB Backup | 1/21/19 05:06 | 1/21/19 05:06 |
| Desktop\My Computer\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents | Directory | Shield Documents | 1/21/19 05:06 | 1/21/19 05:06 |
| Desktop\My Computer\Documents\USB Backup\Personal | Directory | Personal | 1/21/19 05:06 | 1/21/19 05:06 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users | Directory | Users | 9/29/17 08:45 | 1/20/19 02:44 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers | Directory | srogers | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/21/19 05:09 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData | Directory | AppData | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/19/19 03:12 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Local | Directory | Local | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/21/19 16:58 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Roaming | Directory | Roaming | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/21/19 18:22 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Local\Microsoft | Directory | Microsoft | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/20/19 21:17 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows | Directory | Windows | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/21/19 05:09 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft | Directory | Microsoft | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/20/19 21:27 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows | Directory | Windows | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/19/19 03:13 |
| Desktop\C:\\Users\srogers\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent | Directory | Recent | 1/19/19 03:11 | 1/21/19 05:23 |
| Desktop\E:\\Personal | Directory | Personal | 1/21/19 04:59 | 1/21/19 04:54 |
| Desktop\E:\\Shield Documents | Directory | Shield Documents | 1/21/19 04:59 | 1/21/19 04:57 |
| Desktop\E:\\Forensic Tools | Directory | Forensic Tools | 1/21/19 18:34 | 1/21/19 18:34 |
| Desktop\E:\\SANS To Sort | Directory | SANS To Sort | 1/21/19 18:33 | 1/21/19 18:33 |
| Desktop\E:\\Imaging and Triage Lab | Directory | Imaging and Triage Lab | 1/21/19 19:54 | 1/21/19 19:54 |
| Desktop\E:\\Forensic Tools\Imager\_Lite\_3.1.1 | Directory | Imager\_Lite\_3.1.1 | 1/21/19 18:37 | 1/21/19 18:37 |
| Desktop\Shared Documents Folder (Users Files)\Dropbox | Users Files Folder | Dropbox | 1/21/19 05:09 | 1/21/19 05:09 |
| Desktop\Shared Documents Folder (Users Files)\Dropbox\Shield Documents | Directory | Shield Documents | 1/21/19 05:06 | 1/21/19 05:07 |

## APPENDIX VI: Link Analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Local FilePath | Source Created | Source Modified | Source Accessed | File Size | Drive Type | Volume Serial/Label |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Personal\Random Accounting Spreadsheet.xlsx | 2019-01-21 19:16:10 | 2019-01-21 19:16:10 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 10144 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Selection\_of\_materials.ppt | 2019-01-21 19:15:47 | 2019-01-21 19:15:47 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 4237312 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\Cap-2.jpg | 2019-01-21 05:23:13 | 2019-01-21 05:23:13 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\Cap-1.jpg | 2019-01-21 05:22:40 | 2019-01-21 05:22:40 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents\Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:07:00 | 2019-01-21 05:07:00 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 31590 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents | 2019-01-21 05:06:50 | 2019-01-21 05:06:50 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup | 2019-01-21 05:06:50 | 2019-01-21 19:15:47 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| [This PC.lnk](smb://Mac/Home/Documents/_Education/Northeastern/PhD_Cybersecurity/CY5210_Information_System_Forensics/Module_4/Lab_3/CaseFolder/Recent/Recent/This) | 2019-01-21 05:06:50 | 2019-01-21 05:06:50 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 0 | (None) | n/a |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Personal | 2019-01-21 05:06:25 | 2019-01-21 19:16:10 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| E:\Personal\S. Rogers Resume.docx | 2019-01-21 05:06:24 | 2019-01-21 05:06:25 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 17597 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents | 2019-01-21 05:05:04 | 2019-01-21 05:07:00 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| E:\Shield Documents\Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts.xlsx | 2019-01-21 05:05:04 | 2019-01-21 05:06:18 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 10147 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Chapter 4.pdf | 2019-01-21 05:04:46 | 2019-01-21 19:14:41 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 1008692 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Desktop\Alloys.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:04:43 | 2019-01-21 05:04:43 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 697230 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 |
| E:\Alloys.ppt | 2019-01-21 05:00:45 | 2019-01-21 05:04:07 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 946688 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB |
| E:\ [Shield\_USB (E).lnk](smb://Mac/Home/Documents/_Education/Northeastern/PhD_Cybersecurity/CY5210_Information_System_Forensics/Module_4/Lab_3/CaseFolder/Recent/Recent/Shield_USB) | 2019-01-21 05:00:45 | 2019-01-21 05:04:46 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 0 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB |
| [ms-settingsnetwork.lnk](smb://Mac/Home/Documents/_Education/Northeastern/PhD_Cybersecurity/CY5210_Information_System_Forensics/Module_4/Lab_3/CaseFolder/Recent/Recent/ms-settingsnetwork.lnk) | 2019-01-20 21:09:55 | 2019-01-20 21:09:55 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 0 | (None) | n/a |
| [The Internet.lnk](smb://Mac/Home/Documents/_Education/Northeastern/PhD_Cybersecurity/CY5210_Information_System_Forensics/Module_4/Lab_3/CaseFolder/Recent/Recent/The) | 2019-01-19 03:13:02 | 2019-01-20 21:09:55 | 2022-10-07 05:06:43 | 0 | (None) | n/a |

## APPENDIX VII: Jump List Analysis

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Local Path | Target Created | Target Modified | File Size | Drive Type | Volume Serial/Label | Machine ID |
| C:\Program Files\Cybertron\Privacy Eraser\PrivacyEraser64.exe | 2019-01-21 16:58:30 | 2018-07-17 16:25:08 | 7081696 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Program Files\Cybertron\Privacy Eraser\PrivacyEraser64.exe | 2019-01-21 16:58:30 | 2018-07-17 16:25:08 | 7081696 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Program Files\Cybertron\Privacy Eraser\PrivacyEraser64.exe | 2019-01-21 16:58:30 | 2018-07-17 16:25:08 | 7081696 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Downloads\shielddocuments | 2019-01-21 16:57:05 | 2019-01-21 16:57:05 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\Cap-2.jpg | 2019-01-21 05:23:12 | 2019-01-21 05:23:13 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\Cap-1.jpg | 2019-01-21 05:22:40 | 2019-01-21 05:22:40 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents | 2019-01-21 05:21:26 | 2019-01-21 05:21:26 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Dropbox | 2019-01-21 05:09:39 | 2019-01-21 05:21:16 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Chapter 4.pdf | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 04:55:58 | 1008692 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Selection\_of\_materials.ppt | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 04:58:06 | 4237312 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Shield Documents\Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 03:48:38 | 31590 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Personal | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 19:16:11 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Dropbox\Shield Documents | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 05:07:41 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Personal\Random Accounting Spreadsheet.xlsx | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 03:50:58 | 10144 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Selection\_of\_materials.ppt | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 04:58:06 | 4237312 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup\Chapter 4.pdf | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 04:55:58 | 1008692 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Dropbox\Shield Documents\Presentation with Sensitive IP.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:06:54 | 2019-01-21 03:48:38 | 31590 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents\USB Backup | 2019-01-21 05:06:45 | 2019-01-21 19:15:49 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Desktop\Alloys.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:04:38 | 2019-01-21 05:04:42 | 697230 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Desktop\Alloys.pptx | 2019-01-21 05:04:38 | 2019-01-21 05:04:42 | 697230 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| E:\Chapter 4.pdf | 2019-01-21 04:59:58 | 2019-01-21 04:55:58 | 1008692 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Chapter 4.pdf | 2019-01-21 04:59:58 | 2019-01-21 04:55:58 | 1008692 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Alloys.ppt | 2019-01-21 04:59:57 | 2019-01-21 04:56:56 | 946688 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Alloys.ppt | 2019-01-21 04:59:57 | 2019-01-21 04:56:56 | 946688 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Shield Documents\Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts.xlsx | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 04:11:14 | 10147 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Personal\S. Rogers Resume.docx | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 03:58:34 | 17597 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Personal | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 04:54:20 | 0 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Shield Documents | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 04:57:06 | 0 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Personal\S. Rogers Resume.docx | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 03:58:34 | 17597 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| E:\Shield Documents\Confidential Alloy Expense Accounts.xlsx | 2019-01-21 04:59:17 | 2019-01-21 04:11:14 | 10147 | Removable storage media (Floppy, USB) | 6A018124/ Shield\_USB | n/a |
| C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe | 2019-01-20 02:44:31 | 2018-12-12 05:11:41 | 1587680 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe | 2019-01-20 02:44:31 | 2018-12-12 05:11:41 | 1587680 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe | 2019-01-20 02:44:31 | 2018-12-12 05:11:41 | 1587680 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe | 2019-01-20 02:44:31 | 2018-12-12 05:11:41 | 1587680 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Documents | 2019-01-19 03:11:57 | 2019-01-21 05:23:12 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Desktop | 2019-01-19 03:11:57 | 2019-01-21 05:04:43 | 4096 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | avengers01 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Downloads | 2019-01-19 03:11:57 | 2019-01-19 03:12:57 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Videos | 2019-01-19 03:11:57 | 2019-01-19 03:12:57 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Music | 2019-01-19 03:11:57 | 2019-01-19 03:12:57 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |
| C:\Users\srogers\Pictures | 2019-01-19 03:11:57 | 2019-01-19 03:12:57 | 0 | Fixed storage media (Hard drive) | EA174897 | desktop-16pttv2 |